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Abstract 
 
This report is the product of the 6-month curricular internship at Market Access, 
a Portuguese international business consultancy firm. Following success in the national 
market, Market Access has started in 2015 a strategic partnership with UK-based 
Cormack Consultancy Group, as a form of international expansion, started. In June 2016, 
the unexpected result of the Brexit referendum in the UK brought concerns regarding this 
partnership. 
The report aims to offer strategy recommendations for Market Access regarding 
its Scottish-based partner Cormack Consultancy Group given the recent events. The 
question of Brexit is discussed with the use of testimonials of leading European 
economists, government institutions, and official statements of UK and EU 
representatives. Three scenarios of post-Brexit UK-EU trade relations are described and 
analysed in macroeconomic perspective and in the view of Market Access – Cormack 
Consultancy Group partnership.  
As the partnership is not fully developed and established, and both firms are 
young, growing, and flexible, the general medium term strategy recommendation for 
Market Access is to remain flexible and be ready to adapt their services. A strategy 
applicable for the period before the conclusion of Brexit negotiations is suggested, and 
so are recommendations specific for each scenario following Brexit.   
This report clarifies some of the uncertainties that arose as a result of the Brexit 
vote and offers strategy guidance - based on structured and systematic analysis - to Market 
Access.  
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Resumo 
 
Este relatório é o produto final decorrente de 6 meses de estágio curricular junto 
da empresa Market Access, uma firma portuguesa de consultoria internacional de 
negócios. Market Access é bem-sucedida no mercado nacional e, com o objetivo de se 
expandir internacionalmente, formou em 2015 uma parceria estratégica com a Cormack 
Consultancy Group, empresa sediada no Reino Unido. Em Junho de 2016, o inesperado 
resultado do referendo relativo ao Brexit levantou dúvidas em relação à sustentabilidade 
desta parceria.  
O relatório procura oferecer recomendações estratégicas à Market Access em 
relação a como lidar com o seu parceiro sediado na Escócia, Cormack Consultancy 
Group, dados este recente evento. A questão do Brexit é discutida com base em 
testemunhos de economistas líderes europeus, instituições governamentais e ainda, 
declarações oficiais de representantes do Reino Unido (UK) e da União Europeia (UE). 
Três cenários de comércio pós-Brexit UE-UK são descritos e analisados numa 
perspectiva macroeconómica e da parceria Market Access – Cormack Consultancy 
Group. 
Dado que a parceria ainda não está totalmente desenvolvida e consolidada, e 
ambas as empresas são jovens, em fase de crescimento e flexíveis, a recomendação 
estratégica a médio prazo em termos gerais que se oferece à Market Access é a de 
permanecer flexível e preparada para readaptar os seus serviços. A estratégica aplicável 
ao período antecedente às negociações do Brexit é sugerida, tal como são as 
recomendações específicas a cada cenário procedente ao Brexit. 
Este relatório esclarece algumas das dúvidas que surgiram com o resultado do 
Brexit e oferece aconselhamento estratégico à Market Access, baseada em análise 
sistemática.  
 
 
Códigos-JEL: F15, F23, M16 
Palavras-chave: Integração económica, Brexit, União Europeia, 
internacionalização, estratégia de internacionalização, Market Access 
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Introduction 
 
This report is an outcome of the curricular internship at the host institution Market 
Access (MA) that took place between September 2016 and February 2017. Market Access 
is a Portuguese-based international business consultancy that was founded in 2005 and 
over the years of functioning helped over 400 firms and organisations, both from Portugal 
and other countries, to pursue their internationalization projects.  
As a young and growing company, Market Access decided to develop their 
business in other markets by finding a partner company that would offer similar services, 
would have experience finding local clients, and could benefit from Market Access’ 
international network that reaches over 50 countries and possibly expand the number of 
markets. A recent partnership with a Scottish-based Cormack Consultancy Group (CCG) 
was formed in 2015.  
In June, 2016, the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum that 
was held to decide the future of the UK had an unexpected outcome when the majority of 
the expressed votes were in favour of leaving the EU. MA expressed concern regarding 
the recently formed partnership with CCG.  
The aim of this report is to offer strategy recommendations for Market Access 
concerning their Scottish partner, taking into account the development of recent events. 
The strategy guidance should be based on structured and systematic analysis. The 
uncertainty around Brexit makes it desirable to understand better what can happen to the 
UK-EU relations, and what could be the consequences of Brexit for the partnership 
between MA and CCG. The specific objectives of the internship report in order to reach 
the aim are to: 
(1) Compare testimonials of leading European economists and government 
institutions about Brexit; 
(2) Describe and discuss possible scenarios of future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom; 
(3) Make recommendations on the internationalization strategy of Market 
Access given the prospects of the UK-EU relationship.  
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The Brexit vote might be a trigger for reduced integration of the political and 
economic union that is being built since the end of the World War II. For several decades 
we have witnessed a strong movement for economic integration of Europe that was done 
through the creation of the European Union (EU), a political and economic union which 
in 2016 reached the number of 28 member states, classifying as one of the largest world 
economies. Nevertheless, the Brexit vote in June 2016 is perhaps the most noteworthy 
call for reduced integration that the EU has seen, bringing significant uncertainties 
regarding the future of both the UK and the EU. As it is a recent event, there have not 
been many studies treating this topic and applying it to business level.  
The Brexit vote and its likely consequence—the United Kingdom (the UK) 
leaving the European Union (the EU)—can have a strong impact on businesses and 
change the conditions of international business between the UK and the rest of the EU, 
but also between the UK and other trade partners. As Market Access is present in the 
British market through a strategic partnership with Cormack Consultancy Group, a 
modification of trade agreements with the UK might have consequences on their 
operations and turnover. Such a change could cause reduced interest of British firms to 
invest in continental Europe. This internship report shall clarify the Brexit question, and 
through a systematic analysis present recommendations on Market Access’ 
internationalization strategy. 
Chapter 1 focuses on the internship, and presents the host institution Market 
Access in more detail. Chapter 2 recalls the path of the European economic integration 
that led to Brexit, and discusses the future of the UK-EU relations. In Chapter 3, discloses 
and discusses in-field evidence collected thanks to the internship at Market Access, 
defines possible scenarios of future UK-EU relations following Brexit, analyses their 
consequences both from the macroeconomic and the microeconomic perspective, and 
presents strategy recommendations for Market Access. The report ends with a   
conclusion and limitations of this study. 
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Chapter 1. Internship 
 
1.1 Host institution 
 
Market Access is a Portuguese based consultancy firm that is focused on 
supporting firms in entering international markets. It is an SME with 12 years of 
experience in the market, and it has an extensive network of consultants and partners that 
covers over 50 countries of the world. This network is of crucial importance for the firm’s 
operations and quality of services. Market Access offers various services for firms, 
organisations, and associations that are interested in approaching foreign markets.  
 
Tasks performed during the internship 
 
The 6-months internship took place in the facilities of Market Access, Ltd. in Leça 
da Palmeira, Porto region, Portugal, between September 2016 and February 2017. The 
main objective of the internship was to understand the functioning of the operations and 
managerial strategies of Market Access, with an emphasis on the international sales 
partners and the international network. The goal was to have enough information and 
knowledge about the firm to be able to perform a critical analysis of the given strategy 
regarding the Scottish partner Cormack Consultancy Group.  
In order to reach this objective, a set of practical actions such as joint management 
of potential clients with the international sales partners, and preparation of necessary 
documents and support materials to facilitate sales process was conducted and it was 
accounted for the main activity during the whole period of the internship. In the first 
weeks of the internship, a task to work on elaboration of a practical market research for a 
given client was assigned, with the objective to get acquainted with the operational part 
of the firm. Moreover, as Market Access is in a preparatory phase for the ISO 9001 
certification, another set of activities that was assigned was related to the support in 
preparations of documents and mapping of processes in the area of international network 
management. 
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Services offered by Market Access 
 
Market Access developed a range of services that they offer as a tool for their 
clients to enter international markets. Each service has a predefined general methodology, 
yet each project is adapted to the needs and expectations of the client. Moreover, a 
combination of several services is possible, for example a project of support at trade fair 
with aspects of a trade mission. It is common that once a specific project ends, for instance 
a trade mission, it can be followed by another project such as a market development 
project.  
  The most basic service that Market Access offers is a market selection project 
which aims to help the client to assess which market is the most perspective to approach, 
using a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators. It is a tailor-made market study of 
the sector of activity of the client that evaluates ten different markets. The project results 
in a report on the selected markets, a quantitative evaluation, and a ranking of the most 
potential markets.  
The most traditional service is a trade mission that is a short term project lasting 
between 8 and 12 weeks, with an objective to explore business opportunities in a target 
market. The main deliverable of the project is an agenda of meetings scheduled for the 
client who will go on a business visit to the target market, ranging between two and five 
days, depending on the geography and number of meetings scheduled.  
Some organisations prefer to approach their target market by visiting or exhibiting 
at a trade fair. Market Access offers a project in which their local consultant supports the 
client at the trade fair. It involves a few weeks’ preparation before the event with the 
invitation of potential buyers or interested parties to the stand of the exhibiting client, or, 
in the case of a client that is just visiting, scheduling meetings with exhibiting 
organisations and firms. 
The most complex and most appropriate service to achieve success in European 
markets is a market development project which lasts between six and twelve months, 
depending on the size of the market and the number of markets. The approach with this 
type of project is to work as a temporary extension to the client’s sales or export 
department, promoting the entering of the client to the target market or markets. Within 
this project, a phase of preparation for entry can be done as well--translation of marketing 
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and technical materials, help with adaptation of the product to the target market, and 
others. One or more business visits are possible within the duration of the project, 
depending on the level of interest of potential buyers or contacts in the target market or 
markets.  
Inverse trade mission is a popular project for sectorial associations such as food, 
textiles, or construction associations. This type of project is a long term project that can 
last over one year, during which potential buyers or partners from target markets are 
invited to meet with usually more than one member of the association. The potential 
buyers or partners are preselected by Market Access and must be approved by the client 
association before the visit takes place. 
Although Market Access offers the above described types of projects, it is also 
possible to get a tailor-made internationalization service that can be jointly designed by 
the client and Market Access. The appropriate entry strategy and the target market is 
usually discussed and refined between Market Access and the client, depending on the 
product/service in question, expectations, and goals. Moreover, some of Market Access 
consultants present in international markets are specialized in implementing certain types 
of projects but not necessarily  all the above listed types of projects. 
 
1.2  Market Access’ internationalization strategy 
 
Market Access has a large international network covering over 50 countries in the 
world, with the plan to solidify the network in existing markets and expand to new 
markets. The main function of the network is to implement internationalization projects 
that are sold primarily to Portuguese firms wishing to expand their activities to foreign 
markets.  
During the past few years, Market Access has been aiming to reach more 
international clients that would be interested in their services. In order to get the 
international clients outside of Portugal, a physical and active presence of a sales 
representative in the market is needed. For this reason, Market Access decided to look for 
a partner able to provide similar services, share the same values, and benefit from Market 
Access’ expertise, success, and international network. In 2015, a strategic partnership 
with Scottish firm Cormack Consultancy Group was established.  
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CCG is smaller than Market Access, but with a strong presence and success in 
helping British firms to expand abroad since 2000. CCG has its offices in several markets; 
the head office is in Edinburg, Scotland, UK, and other offices are in the USA, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Romania. This network opened opportunities for Market Access not only in 
the British market, but also Market Access decided to actively explore the Baltic markets-
-Lithuania and Latvia. 
In November 2016, Civitta, a large consultancy group based in Estonia, with its 
primary activity in the Baltic states but covering most of Eastern and South-eastern 
Europe, acquired the CCG Baltics office. Charles Cormack, the founder of CCG, justified 
this transition as a strategic move to shift their focus away from the Baltic markets and 
gain a more global outlook, reaching a wider range of world markets, thanks to the 
partnership with Market Access1.  
As the local presence and networks of each of the three firms are valuable, as of 
the beginning of 2017, Market Access is a strategic partner of both Cormack Consultancy 
Group and Civitta. The majority of international sales activities of Market Access 
happens through the strategic partnership in Lithuania, Latvia, and the UK. Given the 
Brexit vote and the threat of the UK losing access to the European Single Market, the 
partnership with CCG UK can be worrisome and the situation and real impacts should be 
further analysed.  
                                                        
1 For more details, see Appendix A – Interview with Charles Cormack. 
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Chapter 2. From European economic integration to Brexit 
 
This Chapter aims to describe briefly the evolution of the European economic 
integration, and investigate the literature treating the question of Brexit.  
 
2.1  Economic integration and the European project 
 
Béla Balassa, one of the major contributors in the field of economic integration, 
defines economic integration as “a process and as a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, 
it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units 
belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by 
the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.” (1961, p. 
174). 
Although Jacob Viner’s classic work “The Customs Union Issue” set a theoretical 
framework for the scientific field of economic integration (Viner, 2014), it was Balassa 
who based his work on Viner’s contribution and succeeded in developing and identifying 
different stages of economic integration. The stages are free-trade area, a customs union, 
a common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration; the latter 
stage comprises of economic, social, fiscal, monetary, and countercyclical policies that 
are in hands of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for member states 
(Balassa, 1961).  
The milestone for global economic integration through trade liberalisation was 
the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948 by 23 
countries, which can be seen as an attempt to correct protectionist policy from early 
1930s, and the devastating World War II (World Trade Organization, 2017). Within the 
47 years of existence of GATT, a continuous tariff and non-tariff barriers reductions were 
multilaterally agreed, and with higher maturity of the organisation, other international 
trade issues such as intellectual property, or dispute settlement were resolved, covering 
123 members in early 1990s. In 1995, the GATT was replaced by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).   
The economic literature presents mainly positive effects of economic integration 
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on a country’s growth and welfare. Economically integrated countries have interactions 
in several dimensions, such as facilitated trade, easier access to capital, and information 
exchange via different channels that enhance growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1993). 
Balassa (1961) argues that one of the most important advantages of economic integration 
is the opportunity to exploit economies of scale given access to a larger market. Baldwin 
(1989) promotes the advantage of lower trade costs (due to decreased or absent tariff and 
non-tariff barriers), and factors mobility such as freedom of movement of goods, services, 
capital, and labour—these four freedom are considered to be one of the key definitions 
of the European Economic Area. Coe and Helpman (1995) emphasize the positive effects 
of enhanced total factor productivity that arises from shared technology and joint 
Research and Development programs. 
Although there are strong arguments for economic integrations, there is a debate 
on the nature of the effects associated to the integration, and that is if they are temporary 
or permanent. Neoclassical growth theory and endogenous growth theory without scale 
effect find that these effects are present, but only temporary, while endogenous growth 
theory with scale effects believe that the effects are both present and permanent. 
(Badinger, 2005) 
 
The European Union and its integration 
 
The second half of the twentieth century was in the spirit of economic integration 
in Western Europe. This movement was strongly supported not only by politicians who 
were interested in peacekeeping right after the destructive World War II, but also by 
economists researching the process of economic integration and its impacts on welfare. 
This political background led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
in 1950 and later in 1957, the European Economic Community was founded by six 
member states, creating a Common Market. As of 2017, the EU has 28 member states 
and is classified as economic and monetary union; the latter is known as Eurozone or 
European Monetary Union (EMU) which consists of 19 member states that accepted Euro 
as their currency (Europa.eu, 2017).  
The project of the European integration that started with six of West European 
countries grew to a large scale, helping the development and consolidation of the Western 
and Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, the decade of 2010s has been challenging 
 
 
 16 
for the EU with several paramount challenges to deal with such as the spreading of the 
global economic crisis, the European debt crisis, rise of Euroscepticism, and the migrant 
crisis. At least partly as a result of all these issues, calls for slowing down or even reverse 
the process of integration within the EU started to appear; the most marking call coming 
from the United Kingdom. Although for many economists economic integration goes 
hand in hand with political integration (Brou and Ruta, 2011), (Alesina et al.) believe that 
“as the process of economic “globalization” will progress, political separatism will 
continue to be alive and well” (2000, p. 1293-1294), putting an example of Catalonia in 
Spain, Brittany in France, or Scotland in the UK that have been fighting for their 
independence. 
 
2.2  Brexit 
As the political pressure from the Eurosceptic party in the UK grew, David 
Cameron, the Prime Minister at the time, promised to hold the United Kingdom European 
Union membership referendum that took place on June 23rd, 2016. The majority (52% of 
the expressed votes) voted “Leave” which led to a more profound discussion on the topic 
of “Brexit”. 
The word “Brexit” was first seen in The Economist magazine in 2012. It is 
believed that it was inspired by the term “Grexit” invented by Ebrahim Rahbari and 
Willem Buiter which is a combination of the words “Greece” and “exit”—a possible 
situation of Greece leaving the EU (Atkins, 2012). Therefore, the term Brexit (an 
aggregation between the words “Britain” and “Exit”) describes the position of the United 
Kingdom leaving the EU.  
Several months prior to the referendum, leading British and other European 
economists and many government institutions started to publish reports and articles 
analysing and predicting effects and consequences of Brexit. There were some positive 
assessments of Brexit effects on the UK, mainly by Brexit supporters such as a group that 
used to be known as “Economists for Brexit”, but recently changed their name to 
“Economists for Free Trade”2. A vast majority of this scientific literature agreed on 
negative results both on the UK economy and on the EU economy. Nevertheless, the 
                                                        
2 https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/ 
 
 
 17 
“Leave” vote prevailed over the “Remain” which leads to different interpretations. 
Pettifor interprets the result of the Brexit vote as “latest manifestation of popular 
dissatisfaction with the economists’ globalized, marketized society” (2017, p.131). Begg 
sees a tendency of “widespread disenchantment about globalisation” in several developed 
economies, including the UK and the Brexit vote (2016, p.33). Cumming and Zahra 
believe that both in the UK and in North America the economic and political reach of 
multinationals and the international trade deals “have left millions without economic and 
political power. Some called for need to balance economic and technological progress 
with national sovereignty and inclusiveness” (2016, p.689). From a slightly different 
perspective, Ryan (2016) argues that based on the May 2015 survey on knowledge of the 
British population about the EU in which the results of the British were the worst among 
all the 28 members of the EU, this lack of knowledge, jointly with misleading arguments 
of Brexit campaign, could have had an impact on the Brexit vote. Entis (2016) believes 
that although there were many reasons that motivated British citizens to vote “Leave”, 
immigration was one of the major issues.  
The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, also known as 
the Brexit referendum, can be considered as a consultation of the British population about 
the future direction of the UK. In order to formalize the request to leave the EU, the UK 
Prime Minister needs to trigger the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty that “provides for a 
mechanism for the voluntary and unilateral withdrawal of a country from the European 
Union” (EUR-Lex, 2017). The European Council provides with the guidelines for Brexit 
negotiations. Only when the agreement between the UK and the EU is reached, or within 
maximum of 2 years from the triggering of the Article 50 (unless the period is extended 
by the European Council), the EU treaties cease to apply in the UK and the UK becomes 
independent from the EU. 
 
 Brexit and its medium and long term effects on the UK economy 
 
There are several scientific publications assessing long term effects of the Brexit 
vote on the British economy, yet the estimations vary considerably and do not allow any 
clear conclusions. The majority of mainstream studies estimate a long term cost of 1-5% 
of GDP per capita (Busch and Matthes, 2016a). However, the estimates range from an 
increase in GDP per capita by 11.5% in case of Brexit (Congdon, 2014) to a decrease in 
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GDP per capita by 20% or more in case of Brexit (Campos et al., 2014). The meta-
analysis by Busch and Matthes (2016b) that is focused on pre-Brexit studies assessing 
long term effects of Brexit on the British economy manages to evaluate thoroughly these 
studies and brings new and more consistent findings. 
In terms of methodology, Busch and Matthes (2016b) divide the studies in two 
major groups; the forward looking models (ex ante) and backward looking models (ex 
post). Among the studies that chose the ex ante approach, we can observe mainly 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) trade models and new quantitative trade models 
(NQTM). Among the backward looking, we have also CGE models, studies using rather 
new synthetic counterfactual method (SCM), modern gravity model, employ the trade-
income-relationship to estimate Britain’s future income, or regression analyses (Busch 
and Matthes, 2016b). 
The studies that Busch and Matthes (2016a) assess as reliable and comprehending 
most relevant factors, tend to agree on the following: the economic disadvantages of 
Brexit seems to be more important than potential advantages. In terms of magnitude of 
the costs, most mainstream researchers estimate rather low long term cost of about 1-5% 
of GDP per capita. However, Busch and Matthes (2016a) question the methods used by 
many mainstream researchers, stating that even the most reliable models seem not to 
include all relevant channels of welfare creation that comes from economic integration.  
Another important fact that Busch and Matthes (2016a) highlight as a criticism to 
mainstream ex ante researches is that ex post analyses tend to show significantly larger 
effects of trade integration in comparison to ex ante models.  The authors present their 
own approach that estimates significantly higher costs than most of the mainstream 
forward looking studies. In their pessimistic scenario, a long run loss in GDP per capita 
can easily overpass 10% in case of Brexit. 
A study by the British governmental entity HM Treasury (2016) estimates the 
effects in the medium-term, which is projected to be around 2 years from the Brexit vote. 
Firstly, they consider two possible scenarios: one consisting of a “shock” after the Brexit 
vote which would lead to expected loss in GDP per capita of 3.6% in comparison to 
“Remain” vote, depreciation of British pound (GBP) by 12% and an increase in 
unemployment by 0.5 million inhabitants; and another scenario characterized by “severe 
shock”, in result of which the expected loss of GDP is of 6% (in comparison to “Remain” 
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vote), depreciation of GBP by 15% and increased unemployment by 0.8 million 
inhabitants. Additionally, the (HM Treasury) report mentions that prolongation of 
negotiations with the EU for a period longer than 2 years would generate even more 
severe negative effect. These impacts are nourished by the situation of uncertainty that 
causes economic agents (firms and households) to postpone consumption or investment 
until the macroeconomic environment stabilizes (also known as wait-and-see effect). 
Moreover, financial institutions are subjected to higher risk premium which increases the 
cost of capital (Rieth et al., 2016). 
 
Post-Brexit trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union 
 
All the above mentioned studies of impacts of Brexit on the British economy make 
their assumptions on the future trade agreement between the UK and the EU, and between 
the UK and other world trade partners. However, the extent of the trade loss is often 
deemed to be underestimated. Today, 60% of British trade is with the EU and EU trade 
agreement partners. Moreover, if the current EU negotiations are concluded, the share 
will rise to 85% of British trade partners (Busch and Matthes, 2016a). Britain’s expected 
exit from the EU (also called Hard Brexit) implies loss of access to the European Single 
Market but also loss of the trade agreements negotiated by the EU with third parties. In 
addition, trade barriers (tariff or non-tariff barriers) will increase British export cost and 
reduce time efficiency.  
This mainstream view is challenged by one of the Economists for Brexit, Professor 
Patrick Minford, who argues that the EU trade policy of protection of the agriculture and 
manufacturing products increases the prices above the level of world prices, thus creating 
an uncompetitive market due to non-tariff barriers (Minford, 2016). Minford (2016) 
suggests that abandoning the EU trade policy, and accepting the WTO rules with the EU 
and all other trade partners, will lead to a trade under free market prices, and for the UK 
a welfare gain of 4% of GDP, and a decrease in consumer prices by 8%. 
Right after the Brexit vote, the main source of uncertainty that arose from the 
result of the referendum was associated with the after-Brexit trade agreement between 
UK and the EU. A number of articles and reports list the options of the UK and conclude 
that the “Norway” model, which consists of maintaining the trade privileges of the 
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European Economic Area (EEA), cannot be politically accepted as it would consist of 
giving up even more sovereignty. The only practical change from the pre-Brexit situation 
would be a loss of voice in defining all new EU regulations.  
Busch and Matthes (2016a), Dhingra and Sampson (2016), Pisani-Ferry et al. 
(2016), Fletcher and Zahn (2016), and Ryan (2016) present a second option that is 
following the model of “Switzerland” which is characterized by a lower level of trade 
integration than EEA, barriers to the movement of services, no need for compliance with 
the EU social and unemployment regulations and other costly policies, and barriers to 
movement of persons. However, this option seems unlikely to be accepted by the EU 
during the negotiations.  
The third option described by Busch and Matthes (2016a) is to follow the 
“Turkey” example which allows for free movement of goods but not of services, capital 
and persons. As restrictions on movement of services and capital is a major drawback, 
the UK would have a strong interest to negotiate a privileged partnership in this area as 
well, yet the EU would likely refuse a customs union as the case of Turkey was 
presumably designed with prospects of future possible membership of Turkey in the EU. 
Begg (2016) presents an option of a similar agreement to the one recently negotiated with 
Canada, which resulted in part of a free trade area with some restrictions.  
Finally Begg (2016), Dhingra and Sampson (2016), Ryan (2016), HM Treasury 
(2016), International Monetary Fund (2016), Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016), Fletcher and Zahn 
(2016), and Busch and Matthes (2016a) note that the lowest level of trade integration 
would be for the UK to have the Most Favourite Nation treatment as any other WTO 
member which consists of export tariff between 4.2% and 15% depending on the product.  
It is important to mention that the above described arrangements of a new trade 
agreement was solely related to the relationship between the UK and the EU. However, 
in terms of impacts of Brexit on the British trade, we have to acknowledge also the cost 
of further negotiations with other non-EU countries that the UK had privileged access 
only as a member of the EU.  
 In addition to the listed scenarios of trade agreements that are based on existing 
models, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016) suggest an innovative approach to create a “Continental 
Partnership”—a new organisation of the EU into two circles; the inner circle being the 
(close to fully integrated) political union, and the outer circle that “would not participate 
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in the freedom of movement of workers, would not share the political commitment to 
ever closer union, and would have less political influence over decisions of common 
interest”.  
 All of the listed authors agree on the following; the one extreme of Brexit (“soft 
Brexit”) is that the UK stays a member of the European Economic Area—following the 
Norway model, the other extreme (“hard Brexit”) is that the UK loses access to the Single 
Market and has a status of most preferred nation of WTO. This is one of the main topics 
of Brexit negotiations between the UK and the rest of the EU. The literature suggests that 
there is a space for a bilateral agreement between the UK and the EU, that could offer 
better trade conditions that the WTO agreement, emphasizing that there is a trade-off 
between benefits of economic integration and political sovereignty of the UK. Figure 1 
provides with a summary of four main possible trade agreements that the UK can 
negotiate with the rest of the EU, including advantages and disadvantages of each option. 
The UK position seems to be more inclined to hard Brexit, and as the UK Prime Minister 
Theresa May states, the UK does not wish to follow models of other countries that are 
part of the EEA, or EFTA (BBC News, 2017a). 
 
Figure 1 - Options for the UK - EU post-Brexit trade agreement 
Source: Dhingra and Sampson (2016) 
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Brexit and Scotland 
 
So far in this report, the focus of the assessment of Brexit impacts was on the UK 
as a whole. However, many authors question the possibility of Scotland as a potentially 
independent country. An independence referendum in Scotland took place in 2014 to 
decide whether Scotland should be an independent country from the UK that resulted in 
majority of Scots voting “No”. Yet, eight months afterwards, the Scottish nationalist 
political party that has much more pro-European than pro-England views, won the 
majority of seats in the election (Ryan, 2016). Moreover, during the Brexit referendum, 
a strong majority of Scottish voted to “Remain” in the EU. Ryan (2016), Fletcher and 
Zahn (2016), and Begg (2016) suggest a possible scenario of a new referendum in 
Scotland on its independence from the UK and remaining in the EU.  
Fletcher and Zahn (2016) question if it would be an option for Scotland to remain 
both in the EU, while belonging to the UK. They bring forward the example of other parts 
of EU member stated that have different parts of EU laws being applied—the case of 
Denmark and Greenland in which Greenland, constitutional part of Denmark, chose to 
leave the EU in 1985. Ramsey (2016) believes that in case the UK does not leave the 
Single Market entirely, there could be a possibility of a “reverse Greenland”. 
The Scottish first minister Nicola Sturgeon stated in March 2017 that she intends 
to throw a second referendum on Scottish independence between autumn 2018 and spring 
2019--at a time when Brexit negotiations are clearer and reaching a conclusion (BBC 
News, 2017b). It is yet unclear which direction Scotland would choose: to continue as a 
member of the EU and face a large geographic distance to the continental Europe, or to 
remain as part of the UK and leave the EU jointly within Brexit.  
Moreover, Doherty et al. (2017) point out the situation of Northern Ireland where 
56% of population voted for “Remain” and which is the only country of the UK that has 
land borders with another EU member state—Ireland. There are several challenges of 
Brexit for this country, namely the future of bilateral agreements between the UK 
(Northern Ireland) and Ireland such as Common Travel Area, or Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement. Moreover, Northern Ireland has strongly integrated trade and supply and 
production chains, but also some institutions with the independent country of Ireland.  
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Brexit and the European Union 
 
Most literature related to Brexit treats the question from the UK point of view. 
The majority of scientific papers and reports were published before the June 2016 
referendum in order to estimate the economic advantages and disadvantages of the EU 
membership so that the British population has scientific analyses available to make a 
more informed decision. Naturally, following the “Leave” vote, more recent literature 
that analyses the perspective of EU member states and businesses outside of the UK starts 
to appear.  
An eBook What to do with the UK? EU perspectives on Brexit that comprises of 
testimonials and opinions of 25 European economists from 15 EU member states and 
Switzerland, brings useful insights from the experts that can help understand the EU 
position regarding the Brexit question (Wyplosz, 2016). Charles Wyplosz describes the 
decades of perceived European integration under the “bicycle principle: you must keep 
moving forward, if you stop, you fall off”, and calls Brexit a “stunning change” that was 
not expected by the EU member states and governments were not prepared for a strategy 
on what to do in case of “Leave”.  
The negotiations that are to start once Article 50 is triggered will be between the 
representatives of the EU and the UK. However, finding a collective position of the EU 
might be a big challenge; firstly, each member state needs to decide their position, and 
secondly, the 27 member states need to find a common position, which can lead to the 
EU27-UK negotiation.  
The economists that contributed to the eBook What to do with the UK? EU 
perspectives on Brexit, were asked to present their opinion on three major issues that the 
UK-EU negotiations must cover; desired trade agreement, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and labour mobility. Regarding trade, the UK is relatively small destination of 
EU27’ exports, yet for some smaller member states such as Ireland it remains a large and 
important trading partner, while from the perspective of the UK, the EU is a destination 
of around half of British exports. Regarding foreign direct investment, mainly smaller 
member states such as Ireland, Netherlands, or Luxembourg, have strong in and out flows 
of FDI with the UK, while larger member states, such as France, Germany, or Spain, 
receive more FDI from the UK then send. Labour mobility is a very sensitive topic as one 
of the main topics of the Brexit campaign was to regulate the migration and to close the 
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UK borders to EU labour movements. The British position is to leave the Single Market 
and an immediate question is what will be the rights from the EU citizens living in the 
UK, and of British citizens living in EU member states (Wyplosz, 2016). 
Wyplosz (2016) also engages in the debate about what Brexit should look like and 
there are basically two views; a ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexit, which comes down to a “deep 
severance of economic and political links on the one hand, and a quasi-membership 
associated with mutual concessions on the other” (Wyplosz, 2016). Many economists 
from different EU members state that hard Brexit, with negotiations starting with a “clean 
slate” rather than changing current agreement, should be preferred. Some countries, 
mainly those with strong economic and historical ties, might be more inclined to promote 
soft Brexit. The main problem associated with soft Brexit is a fear of EU27 that other 
member states might seek the same arrangement and follow the steps of the UK which 
can lead to further damage of the EU project.  
Although testimonials and opinions from many European economists were 
disclosed in the eBook, as Market Access is based in Portugal, we put more focus on the 
testimonial of local authors. Portugal is in the group of potentially “soft” negotiators as it 
has very strong commercial ties with the UK, with UK being the fourth most important 
trading partner for Portugal, after Spain, France, and Germany (Tavares and Jorge, 2016). 
Moreover, freedom of movement of people is a big issue as there are a lot of recent 
emigrants from Portugal that are living in the UK, but also Portugal is a popular 
destination for British tourists and senior British citizens. Tavares and Jorge (2016) 
believe that the most likely outcome of Brexit negotiations is a hard Brexit, and in that 
case Portugal will most likely try to reach a bilateral agreement with the UK on certain 
level of freedom of movement of people—this negotiation can take up to a decade. 
 
Predictions of Brexit impact on businesses 
 
Both Begg (2016) and Busch and Matthes (2016a) predict that as a result of 
Brexit, there will be a partial relocation of the financial centre from London to big EU 
financial capitals such as Frankfurt and Paris. Furthermore, many British-based firms that 
are exporting to the EU will shift part of their jobs and offices (some even headquarters) 
to the European continent to keep their access to the EU market that is crucial for their 
operations. Cumming and Zahra (2016) suggest that also human resources might be 
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affected, as “the financial and technological uncertainties created by Brexit are likely to 
encourage entrepreneurs to locate elsewhere in the EU”, Dishman (2016) points out that 
results of a survey show that 20% of British entrepreneurs think of moving to another 
country.  
According to Casson (2016), British businesses need to evaluate the following 
risks: depreciation of pound, stock volatility, financing and investing uncertainty, trade 
barriers, and withdrawal of the EU regional funding. Moreover, financial sector should 
beware of future loss of passporting rights (International Monetary Fund, 2016),  (Pisani-
Ferry et al., 2016), (Galbraith, 2017). 
Holmes et al. (2016) highlight the importance of national and supra-national 
institutions that have a substantial impact on the time horizon of managers’ planning of 
international expansion, R&D expenditures, and other capital spending and investments. 
Relating this to the question of Brexit, Holmes et al. (2016) claim that “with Brexit, these 
institutions are subject to considerable strain, if not upheaval. This is likely to create 
institutional voids that cause delays in business decisions.” As a result of Brexit, legal 
barriers concerning limitation of immigration and trade are likely to be implemented. 
Such barriers are believed to be decreasing the positive impacts of entrepreneurship on 
economic growth (Cumming et al., 2014), (Zahra, 2014). Entis (2016) points out that the 
evidence specific to Brexit is consistent with the literature that predicted negative impacts 
of Brexit on the UK economy; stating that part of these impacts can be explained by 
Brexit’s barriers to immigration, and highlighting the importance of immigration on 
growth and development.  
Although most predict that Brexit and the uncertainty surrounding the future UK 
trade relations with the rest of the EU and other trade partners will have a negative impact, 
some believe that small businesses can face the threat and turn it into an opportunity by 
adapting and refocusing their strategy, as well as taking advantage of lower borrowing 
costs (Dishman, 2016).   
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Chapter 3. Prospects for Market Access internationalization strategy 
 
In the introduction of this report, we have identified the following specific 
research objectives: 
(1) Compare testimonials of leading European economists and government 
institutions about Brexit; 
(2) Describe and discuss possible scenarios of future relationship between the 
EU and the UK; 
(3) Make recommendations on the internationalization strategy of Market 
Access given the prospects of the UK-EU relationship. 
Once the testimonials have been collected, analysed and integrated to reach 
conclusions about the possible future arrangement of the UK-EU relation, the report now 
proceeds towards objectives (2) and (3). 
As the formal negotiation process between the UK and the rest of the EU starts in 
March 2017 at the moment that the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty is triggered, a certain 
degree of uncertainty will remain, yet some scenarios become more likely to happen than 
others. To ensure a broader analysis that can bring useful insights, a list of several possible 
scenarios is created based on the latest official statements.  
Given the prospects of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, we get 
now to the stage of applying the analysis on the business level, in particular from the 
perspective of MA-CCG partnership. During this stage of the analysis, a testimonial of 
CCG manager is of great importance, together with literature that tries to predict the 
impacts of Brexit on businesses. This analysis serves as a basis for strategy 
recommendation both for general short and medium term strategy guidelines, and also 
for some specific suggestions for each scenario.  
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3.1. Evidence of changes in business strategy following the Brexit vote 
 
In-field empirical evidence 
 
The following part of the report presents empirical evidence of the Brexit impacts 
on business, with a focus on concrete cases of British firms and organisations that were 
possible to observe thanks to the activities of MA-CCG.  
As MA and CCG provide services for international expansion and approaching of 
foreign markets, and deal with local companies and organisations on a daily basis, the in-
field experience can be considered as sufficiently relevant to get the right idea about the 
overall market situation. Charles Cormack, the founder of CCG and the main figure that 
deals with British potential clients highlighted several major changes in companies’ 
behaviour that he observes since the Brexit vote (See Appendix A). Firstly, there is a 
general shift of interest from the EU markets towards markets outside of Europe, mainly 
towards the USA and large South American countries such as Brazil or Colombia. 
Secondly, compatible with the literature predicting the impacts of Brexit, we have 
observed that a lot of British companies postpone their internationalization projects due 
to the uncertainty of future UK-EU relationship. In fact, several firms provided with a 
feedback that they are interested in MA-CCG services, yet prefer to focus now on the 
home market and expect to come back to the internationalization plans in one-year time.  
British universities and research centres are a marking exception from this general 
trend. Since the Brexit vote, these educational organisations are focusing more on finding 
partner universities in EU. Charles Cormack explains this change and believes that the 
reasoning is that the British universities considered the EU market as their home market, 
and for long time they have been benefiting from exchange programs covered by the EU 
funds and programmes (such as Erasmus+ program). Since the access to these funds and 
programs is likely to become limited, the universities are developing their individual 
strategy for Europe, trying to get partnerships with EU universities before the Brexit 
negotiations are concluded.  
Some of the potential clients that have been discussing internationalization 
opportunities with MA-CCG mentioned that the Brexit vote made them change their 
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strategy. One concrete example is a British owner and the main sales representative of a 
British company that produces their food products in Spain and sells them solely in the 
British market3. This businessman stated that due to Brexit, they decided to change their 
strategy, abandon the British market, and refocus the target market to Western European 
countries. The reasoning was that the business operations would become too costly if the 
same business model was used; buy primary materials and produce in Spain, export to 
the UK (facing potential trade barriers), and sell on the UK market whose purchasing 
power has decreased dramatically.  
Several authors predicted that British companies and organisations whose main 
market is the EU will consider relocation of part of their offices or even their headquarters 
to a EU member state in order to grant their access to the Single Market. As a response 
to this new demand on the British market, Cormack Consultancy Group started to offer a 
new service that comprises of assisting the client in relocation of their office to the EU 
markets that are covered by CCG. The most promoted destination are the Baltic states 
where CCG has their experienced local consultants that are able to assist with 
administrative and bureaucratic issues. Charles Cormack stated that at the moment they 
are helping several British firms to settle their office in the Baltics.  
Undoubtedly, there have been many changes in firms’ and organisations’ strategy 
that are connected to the results of the Brexit vote. Some firms decided to follow the “wait 
and see” strategy, some decided to focus away from the EU markets for the time being 
and focus on other markets, and some that cannot take the risk of losing access to the 
European Single Market pursue their internationalization project by finding partners or 
moving their own (head)office in the EU. Table 1 offers a summary of the recorded 
changes in business strategy that are a result of the Brexit vote.  
 
 
 
 
 
In-field empirical evidence Explanation 
Postponing of investment Wait and see strategy 
                                                        
3 More concrete information or name of the potential client cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons. 
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Switch of target market for international 
expansion 
Expansionist strategy for certain markets, 
wait and see for others  
Internationalization through a strategic 
partner finding in EU  
Expansionist strategy 
Relocation of headquarters to the EU Expansionist strategy  
Table 1 - Summary of empirical evidence of changes in business strategy due to 
Brexit referendum 
 
 
Exchange rate impacts 
 
Adding to all above described barriers and limits, the British pound depreciation 
has been harmful for the partnership between MA and CCG UK. On the day when the 
Brexit referendum votes were published, the financial markets showed a radical drop of 
British pound in relation to other strong world currencies. During the year 2015, the 
exchange rate was above 1.35 GBP/EUR, in the first 6 months of 2016, before the Brexit 
referendum, the rate was around 1.30 GBP/EUR. Following the results of the vote, a 
major fall of the pound occurred, and the exchange rate since the vote has been around 
1.15 GBP/EUR, resulting into more than 10% of depreciation of the British pound against 
the Euro (See Figure 2). 
Source: Author’s own conception 
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Source: XE 
Figure 2 – GBP to EUR exchange rate 
 
 
Market Access as a Portuguese-based firm does face a certain exchange rate risk. 
Although its services are invoiced in local currency—Euro, there are some projects that 
concern British organisations that wish to approach a foreign market. In that case, it is a 
common practice that these services are denominated in British pounds as they can be a 
subject to export subsidies that are often applicable only if this service is provided by and 
invoiced by a local consultancy firm. 
Even though there is no direct financial risk regarding uncertainty of revenues 
from sold services as the services provided by Market Access office are invoiced in EUR, 
the historically dramatic depreciation of the British pound related to Euro still has a 
relevant impact on Market Access. When British partner CCG presents the proposal of 
services to a potential British client, the final price is denominated in British pounds. 
Therefore, the final price in British pounds is composed of Market Access price in euros 
and a margin for CCG UK that adds into account the exchange rate risk. With a 
depreciation of around 10%, Market Access becomes a priori (unless part of the loss of 
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competitiveness is absorbed by lower margin of CCG UK) directly 10% less competitive 
which can have an impact on the number of UK clients willing to work with MA-CCG. 
 The drop of the British pound is harmful for the concrete case of MA-CCG, but 
for some British industries and firms, the radical depreciation of the pound sterling led to 
an increased price competitiveness and higher profits. The British tourism has 
experienced its records in visitors coming mainly from North America and the EU, a big 
part of this increase can be explained by the weaker pound (Allen, 2017). Other British 
producers and shops such as Primark, took advantage of the inflow of tourists and show 
record-high revenues (Primark lucra com o Brexit, 2017).  
 
3.2. Listing and description of possible scenarios of the post-Brexit UK-
EU trade relations 
 
The literature that describes and analyses various possibilities of trade relations 
between the UK and the rest of the EU that can arise as a consequence of the “Leave” 
vote at the Brexit referendum, defines two extreme solutions: (i) remaining in the 
European Economic Area (taking a similar position as Norway); and (ii) losing the access 
to the European Single Market, taking a position as a non-privileged WTO member, 
following the most preferred nation tariff. Some authors suggest different trade models 
with limited access to the EEA, yet preferential than the WTO member status. These 
possible trade agreements either follow a model of a given country, such as Switzerland, 
Canada, or Turkey, or offer space for negotiation of a new preferential agreement that 
does not follow any of the existing models.  
Most of the literature was published before the Brexit referendum as its purpose 
was to conduct a scientific evaluation of impacts of Brexit in case of “Leave” vote—
trying to provide British citizens with a robust analysis for them to make a well-informed 
decision. Some of the literature discussed was published after the June 2016 referendum, 
yet a lot of new inputs on the political field became available since. The UK Prime 
Minister Theresa May made it clear in her official statements that “Brexit means Brexit” 
and the current situation in March 2017 suggests that the option of remaining part of the 
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EEA would go against the wishes of the British population. Moreover, she stated that the 
UK will not aim to follow examples of some existing countries in their trade agreement 
with the EU (BBC News, 2017a). As for the position of the EU, it is believed that it will 
take a position of a tough negotiator to prevent other member states to follow the same 
path of the UK and weakening the EU.  
To analyse likely scenarios and their impacts on MA-CCG partnership, we will 
follow the advice of Courtney et al. from the article Strategy Under Uncertainty: 
“All strategy making begins with some form of situation analysis—that is, a 
picture of what the world will look like today and what is likely to happen in the future.” 
(1997, p.8) 
Based on the official statement of UK’s position as of March 2017, for the further 
analysis in this paper, we exclude the options stated in literature such as Norway or 
Switzerland. Taken into consideration Theresa May’s letter invoking Article 50 
(GOV.UK, 2017) and the EU draft guidelines following this notification4, we define three 
scenarios that are believed to be the most likely to take place. As Cormack Consultancy 
Group is based in Scotland and the future of the Scotland is uncertain—an official 
statement of the First Minister of Scotland promises a second independence referendum 
in Scotland, thus contributing for division of “Hard” Brexit scenario in the following two 
scenarios. Scenario A defined as “Hard Brexit and Scotland leaves the UK”, Scenario B: 
“Hard Brexit and Scotland remains in the UK”. In the analysis, we include a scenario for 
a new bilateral agreement that follows the idea of a desired “deep and special partnership” 
between the UK and the EU (GOV.UK, 2017). Such an agreement can be inspired by 
some traits of some existing trade agreements between the EU and a third country such 
as Canada, Ukraine, or Turkey—this option is Scenario C: “UK-EU Bilateral preferential 
agreement”.  
 
Scenario A: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland leaves the UK 
 
                                                        
4 http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf 
 
 
 33 
The term “Hard” Brexit describes a scenario in which the UK loses access to the 
European Single Market which is defined by the four fundamental freedoms; freedom of 
movement of capital, people, goods, and services. It was pointed out by the EU 
representatives that these freedoms are indivisible and it is not possible to have access to 
the Single Market without complying with the four freedoms. Both the UK in the letter 
triggering the Article 50 (GOV.UK, 2017) and the Council of the EU5 acknowledge that 
“cherry picking” is not an option.  
For further analysis, it is assumed that the term “Hard” Brexit refers to a trade 
relationship between the UK and the EU once that the negotiations are concluded, the UK 
having a status of a WTO member and being subject to most favoured nations (MFN) 
tariff and non-tariff barriers when trading with the rest of the EU. This option is in line 
with UK’s official position as of March 2017, in case that no agreement related to trade 
relations is made between the EU and the UK, WTO membership should be the default 
option (GOV.UK, 2017). The UK under this scenario does not have access to the Single 
Market, does not need to comply with freedom of movement of people (one of the main 
arguments of the pro-Brexit movement), and does not benefit from free trade of goods 
and services with the EU, although all goods exported to the EU must meet EU product 
standards and regulations. Among the advantages for the UK listed by Dhingra and 
Sampson (2016) (See Figure 1 - Options for the UK - EU post-Brexit trade agreement) is 
the increased sovereignty of the UK that allows it to negotiate trade deals with third 
parties independently from the EU, the UK has no obligation to contribute to the EU 
budget, and has the freedom to set its own economic policies and various regulations.  
A broadly discussed topic for the past few years is the integrity of the UK and 
repetitive call for independence of Scotland from the rest of the UK. In September 2014, 
a Scotland-wide referendum on the Scottish independence from the UK took place, with 
a result of 55% of Scottish population being against the independence. Some believe that 
certain issues that would appear if Scots voted “Yes” in the independence vote such as 
what currency should be adopted, what would be Scotland’s position within the EU, or 
withdrawal of public expenditure from the UK, would have significantly damaging 
impacts on Scotland (Begg, 2016).  
                                                        
5 http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf 
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Although the first Scottish referendum resulted in remaining in the UK, the 
nationalist party that promoted this independence vote won a majority in the latest general 
Scottish election. It is generally known that Scotland manifests more pro-EU than pro-
England inclination that was shown also during the Brexit referendum during which 62% 
of Scots voted “Remain” while only 38% voted “Leave” (See Figure 3). Moreover, not 
even in one electoral district in Scotland would there be a majority of “Leave” votes. 
Right after the results of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum 
were published, the Scottish First Minister made clear that Scots have a distinctive and 
different view on the EU membership than the rest of the UK, particularly England and 
Wales (BBC News, 2016a).  
Figure 3 - Brexit referendum results per country   
 
Smith (2016) looks into the demography of Scots who voted both in the Scottish 
independence referendum and in the Brexit referendum and tries to find a pattern by 
groups in order to investigate possible outcome of a likely second independence 
referendum. The trend is summarized in Table 2. Smith (2016) points out that the results 
according to age structure are consistent but those of social status groups seem to be rather 
inconsistent. It is questionable whether the direction of the Brexit negotiations and (lack 
of) representation of Scottish views in this negotiation process will manage to reverse the 
Source: BBC 
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55-45 result of the first Scottish referendum. Charles Cormack observes a strong pro-EU 
spirit in Scotland and believes that a second independence referendum is much more 
likely to be successful this time, yet predicts that another referendum would add to the 
uncertainty and would have negative impacts on business.  
 
 
 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum: “Should 
Scotland be an independent 
country”? 
2016 Brexit referendum: “Should 
the United Kingdom remain a 
member of the European Union or 
leave the European Union?” 
Elderly NO Leave 
Young YES Remain 
Low income YES Leave 
High income NO Remain 
 
Table 2 - Summary of voting trend of Scots 
 
 
It is interesting to recall what were the impacts on businesses before the Scottish 
independence referendum. Charles Cormack claims that the uncertainty about the vote 
and the possibility of Scottish independence from the UK led to a slowdown of investment 
in Scotland. With on-going Brexit negotiations, the possible second Scottish 
independence referendum might result into more damage for businesses in Scotland. 
Charles Cormack observes that nine months after the Brexit referendum, capital market 
are suffering and many firms are putting investment decisions on hold. 
In case that a second Scottish independence referendum takes place before the 
Brexit negotiations are concluded, as Nicola Sturgeon plans, and Scots vote for the 
independence from the UK, it would lead to more years of uncertainty and economic 
instability. First of all, in order to get independence from the UK, Scotland would likely 
have to go through a long process of leaving the EU as part of the UK and losing of EU 
Source: Author’s own conception based on the information in Smith (2016) 
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membership, leaving the UK including the British pound and face withdrawal from the 
UK public expenditure. Only after the exit from the rest of the UK would Scotland be 
able to reapply for the EU membership. This process includes several stages; the first 
stage between the 2nd Scottish independence referendum and the actual Brexit (estimated 
to be between Autumn 2018 and Spring 2019), the second stage of reapplication of 
Scotland to become a member of the EU, and last stage of renewed membership of the 
EU. Under this scenario, we can expect that this process could take several years during 
which local economy and businesses are likely to be severely harmed.  
If Scots vote to leave the UK and aim to re-enter the EU, they choose to distant 
themselves from one big and strong neighbour economy that is the rest of the UK, and 
try to reconnect with a large union. It can be expected that the political and economic 
relations between Scotland and the rest of the UK would cool down, presumably 
represented by the necessary physical border between the two independent countries. In 
this case, once that Scotland would re-enter the EU, the trade agreement applied would 
be the trade agreement negotiated during the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the 
EU. In this scenario, it is presumed to be a relation of two WTO members with MFN 
tariff applied which would definitely lead to worse trading conditions between Scotland 
and the rest of the UK. Nonetheless, Scotland would go back to enjoying access to the 
Single Market, including all four fundamental freedoms of the EU, and possibly refocus 
partially trade from the UK to Ireland and continental Europe.  
 
Scenario B: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland remains in the UK 
 
Under scenario B, the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU result into 
the UK leaving the Single Market and giving up the four freedoms; freedom of movement 
of people, goods, services, and capital. It is assumed that under this scenario the trade 
relation between the two parties follows the rules of WTO and the MFN tariff is applied, 
yet the UK needs to abide with EU regulations and standards on exported goods towards 
the EU market. The trade agreement between the UK and the EU is corresponding to the 
one already described above in scenario A.  
Scenario B assumes that a second independence referendum of Scotland takes 
place and the result is that Scots decide to remain part of the UK. As discussed in previous 
section 4.2.1., it is likely that the referendum takes place before the Brexit negotiations 
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are concluded, yet the results of this referendum is uncertain and might depend on several 
factors.  
First of all, 62% of Scots voted in favour of the UK remaining in the EU. Smith 
(2016) argues that the 38% of Scottish voters that voted “Leave” might be seen as a 
relatively high number, especially given that no party of the Scottish parliament was 
actively promoting the Leave campaign, although the UK-wide Brexit campaign reached 
Scots as well. It is also questionable if enough of the 55% of voters that chose “No” in 
the Scottish independence referendum would change their position and reconsider voting 
for independence in a second referendum. 
Assuming that the reason of the majority of “NO” votes during the first 
referendum was mainly related to the issues of economic instability and uncertainty about 
the currency to be adopted, public expenditures, and the EU membership, it is likely that 
most of these issues will remain but one will become clearer—the future of the EU 
membership of potentially independent Scotland. The outcome of the second Scottish 
independence referendum is likely to be affected by the status of Brexit negotiations 
which by the assumed time of the referendum will be more advanced and the future deal 
between the UK and the EU will be more concrete. Furthermore, the extend of 
representation of the Scottish view in the Brexit negotiations might be of high importance, 
making Scots incline more towards either of the Unions. Theresa May claims that the UK 
government will represent specific interests of all regions of the UK and expects that 
sovereignty of each regional government within the UK should increase (GOV.UK, 
2017). Another factor that might be decisive is the political argument and campaign for 
Scottish independence, especially the robustness of a concrete strategical plan and next 
steps in case the vote is in favour of independent Scotland.  
Smith (2016) believes that although Scotland is more pro-EU than England, when 
it comes to the time of choosing which union—the EU or the UK—to belong to in a 
possible second Scottish referendum, Scots would incline to remain part of the UK rather 
than the EU for a number of reasons, including a physical border barrier between Scotland 
and England. 
Under scenario B, the UK remains entire and the trade barriers and overall 
economic impact that are described by the literature are common for all countries within 
the UK.  
 
 
 38 
 
 
Scenario C: Bilateral preferential agreement 
 
In contrast to above described scenarios A and B that are very specific and are 
based on a trade relation option of WTO member that is widely present in the literature, 
Scenario C is less concrete and does not follow specifically any of the options suggested 
by the literature. However, it offers space for particular negotiations between the EU and 
the UK as a member state that decided to leave the union, which is a first case of its kind 
with no specific model to follow.  
The literature treating Brexit and options for the new UK-EU trade relation agrees 
not only on the extreme cases which are the “Norway” model and the WTO model, but 
also states that there are other options available. The range of possibilities is subject to a 
trade-off between political sovereignty and benefits of economic integration—the 
Norway model has benefits of economic integration such as access to the Single Market, 
but also a substantially low political sovereignty and need to implement Single Market 
policies, and an obligation to contribute to the EU budget. It seems that the Brexit that 
the UK Prime Minister aims to get, values more political sovereignty than benefits of 
economic integration. The position of the UK relative to control of migration goes against 
the freedom of movement of people within the Single Market and therefore the “soft” 
Brexit seems to be out of question. Scenario C presents a post-Brexit trade agreement that 
offers the UK significant political sovereignty, yet provides with a preferential trade 
conditions with the rest of the EU comparing to the WTO member position.  
Some elements of the “Canada” model can be present in this agreement such as a 
free trade agreement with restriction on certain types of goods, decreasing or avoiding 
the tariff barrier on most important trade sectors between the UK and the EU such as 
automotive industry (Begg, 2016). The recently signed Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada should facilitate the goods, 
services and capital flows between the two parties (European Commission, 2017). 
Nonetheless, the Canada model does not offer any preferential agreement on exports of 
services which is a big part of the UK exports towards the EU—financial and business 
services. Theresa May proposes a Free Trade Agreement between the UK and the EU that 
would extend to financial services and network industries (GOV.UK, 2017) and it seems 
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that the EU is ready to negotiate such an ambitious agreement6. Furthermore, both parties 
agree that they aim to have a close partnership after the UK leaves the EU, that should be 
extended further than on trade arrangement. 
Other preferential trade agreements, namely between the EU and its 
geographically close countries such as Ukraine or Turkey aim to have a deeper 
cooperation by lowering tariffs but also by applying some EU policies and standards that 
can be seen as a preparatory phase for a possible future membership of the EU. This is 
not the case of the UK, that has been a member of the EU for decades and such structural 
investments in better functioning and more integrated markets might be of higher 
importance to the EU. Nonetheless, Duff (2017) argues that based on European Council’s 
guidelines on Brexit negotiation and in particular in which areas the cooperation should 
remain tight - such as security, terrorism, crime, and defence -, the recent agreement 
between the EU and Ukraine can work as a template for the UK-EU agreement 
negotiations. In case of successful negotiations, a stable EU and a sovereign UK that 
manage to make a bilateral agreement can send a signal to the rest of the world that these 
mature economies are able to overpass difficulties and remain strong. 
This scenario, on the one hand, is not very concrete, it relies on a number of 
assumptions and leaves a lot of details unanswered. On the other hand, it provides with a 
big picture of a trade agreement that offers somehow preferential relation over the WTO 
member status that can be interesting for some sectors in particular and will be useful in 
the following sections of the report. The question of Scotland is not answered, neither 
assumed in this scenario. For application in business area, a mix of scenarios might be 
possible by taking certain arguments and predictions that become apparent due to current 
affairs and on-going negotiations between the UK and the EU. 
 
3.3. Implications for the Market Access – Cormack Consultancy Group 
partnership 
 
                                                        
6 http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf 
 
 
 40 
In the section 4.3. of the report, we analyse implications of each of the previously 
described scenarios on the partnership between Market Access and Cormack Consultancy 
Group. In contrast to the previous section 4.2. that used a macroeconomic perspective, 
this section relates the topic directly to the business level and more precisely to the case 
study of Market Access.  
Charles Cormack, the founder and chairman of Cormack Consultancy Group, was 
willing to contribute with his thoughts and business strategy to this report, thus this 
section has strong inputs of Market Access’ partner and is not based purely on 
assumptions (See Appendix A). Mr Cormack shared CCG’s strategy in case there is a 
“Hard” Brexit which he defines as loss of access to the Single Market. Under all three 
scenarios that are examined in this report, this would be the case and CCG would aim to 
relocate their head office from Scotland to Ireland, while keeping the Scottish office 
operating.  
This planned strategic move is of great importance for the evaluation of the 
consequences of Brexit for Markets Access, as it eliminates a significant part of the 
uncertainty. We can consider that in terms of limits to trade of services between these two 
parties there will be no change from the current situation of the two partners being listed 
as EU companies. Nonetheless, the functioning of MA – CCG partnership depends on 
local (whole UK, Scottish, or Irish) businesses interested in internationalization services 
which can vary substantially depending on the scenario of post-Brexit UK-EU relations.   
 
Scenario A: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland leaves the UK 
 
Scenario A seems to be the most straightforward when it comes to definition, yet 
the most complex in terms of steps and different stages that Scotland would go through. 
For this analysis, three distinct stages must be discussed. First is the period between the 
second Scottish referendum (with a result pro-independence) and the cessation of the 
UK’s membership in the EU. Based on statements of Nicola Sturgeon and the maximum 
of two-year negotiation period of Brexit, we can assume that this stage would take place 
between autumn 2018 and March 2019. The second stage is the transitory period in which 
Scotland leaves the UK, becomes independent and reapplies to the EU. This stage can be 
lasting for several years following spring 2019. In the third stage, the situation stabilizes 
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and Scotland becomes a member of the EU as an independent country. This path can take 
many years during which the political and economic instability would be very harmful 
for local businesses.  
It can be expected that with changes of currency, public budget, legislation, and 
other institutional changes, private investment will be held back and the overall economic 
activity will slow down or decrease. As Charles Cormack points out that “even under the 
scenario of Scotland leaving the UK and staying in the EU, the uncertainty and politic 
instability is likely to bring more severe negative effects (at least in short term) than seen 
right after the Brexit vote”. Given the complexity of the process of Scotland leaving the 
UK and reapplying to the EU, the negative effects are more likely to be present not only 
in short term, but in medium term that can easily be five years, up to a decade from the 
Brexit referendum.  
The fact that the UK is leaving the European also has specific impacts on the UK 
sector of international business consulting as most SMEs that are clients of firms as 
Cormack Consultancy Group or Market Access partially finance their internationalization 
project using regional or national funds that are often connected to European funds. The 
funds that aim to stimulate trade within the Single Market and to improve competitiveness 
and R&D are available to candidates from the EU member states which suggests that 
once that the UK leaves the EU, their access to such funds will be impossible. It is unclear 
whether the European funding programs will be sufficiently replaced and financed by the 
UK and by the Scottish government. As Ireland remains a member of the EU, the potential 
Irish clients of MA-CCG do have access to such forms of funding that are of major help 
for functioning of international business consultancies.  
 From the business point of view, it is possible that many firms that participate in 
trade outside of Scotland might consider opting for a similar strategy as Cormack 
Consultancy Group—relocate the head office to an EU country. Successful businesses 
might focus on targeting a stable or growing market and decide to internationalise. These 
kinds of strategies give business opportunity to consultants in international business such 
as CCG and MA.  
Although there can appear certain opportunities mainly in short term, in medium 
and long term the dissolution of the UK can lead to colder relations between the rest of 
the UK and independent Scotland. Depending on the relations between Scotland and the 
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rest of the UK following Brexit and the independence of Scotland, it is possible that the 
access to the rest of the UK’s market will become more difficult. A Scottish CCG might 
not be able to reach and get clients from the whole UK which can be a big loss since 
England, the largest part of the UK with the highest economic activity, would not be in 
the same market anymore. The market covered by CCG might get limited to Scotland 
(and Ireland). Alternatively, in case that the relations between Scotland and the rest of the 
UK are good, and potentially the two markets become more closely connected than the 
rest of the UK with the EU as whole, it might be possible that the Scottish office can work 
as a “bridge” between the UK and the EU.  
 
Scenario B: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland remains in the UK 
 
In comparison to Scenario A, there are several differences when it comes to 
impacts on businesses in the UK. First of all, the period of uncertainty and political 
instability is expected to be much shorter and limited to the Brexit negotiations and the 
following transition period that is likely to take place in order to accommodate all 
changes related to the UK leaving the EU. As of the day of invoking the Article 50 to 
leave the EU, the UK Prime Minister promised to “seek to ensure continuity and 
certainty” (GOV.UK, 2017) which was followed by a reply from Donald Tusk, the 
president of the EU Council, that the EU will focus on minimizing uncertainty, mainly 
for EU citizens, member states, and businesses (European Council, 2017). This shared 
vision of both parties to reduce uncertainty as much as possible is most welcome by 
businesses. It is believed that the sooner the Brexit agreement is concluded, the better.  
Nonetheless, with reduced economic integration that Brexit is to bring, the trade 
flows between the UK and the EU are expected to decrease in comparison to the pre-
Brexit period. The loss of access to the Single Market that will be replaced with status of 
a WTO member, will result in higher trade barriers—tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the 
overall increased cost and decreased time efficiency of the UK-EU trade. Ghemawat 
(2001) suggests that being part of a common regional trading bloc and having a common 
polity are some of the attributes that make the trading distance between two countries 
smaller. As of Brexit, the UK-EU trading distance will be increasing. Nevertheless, other 
attributes presented by Ghemawat remain unchanged for the UK-EU relations and given 
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mainly the economic and geographical size, geographical proximity, and the development 
of both economies, the trade, although reduced, will remain substantially important. 
Once the uncertainty about the post-Brexit agreement is gone, it is expected that 
the UK organisations retrieve back their interest in the EU markets. As of the CCG-MA 
partnership, this would be good news given that Market Access considers that the 
internationalization projects targeted to the EU markets are its strength and also the 
markets with highest price competitiveness. 
One of the biggest arguments that Brexit supporters manifested is that a sovereign 
UK that is not bound by EU foreign policy will have the freedom to negotiate its own 
trade agreements with third parties. On the one hand, leaving the EU will also lead to 
losing the privilege of being covered by all negotiated trade agreements by the EU. On 
the other hand, there exists the possibility that a new trade agreement can be negotiated 
with some key partners, such as the USA, that would allow better conditions than the 
current EU member. If this is the case, an increased interest in markets that become more 
easily accessible can occur, leaving space for MA-CCG to respond to this increasing 
demand.  
 
Scenario C: Bilateral preferential agreement 
 
The Scenario C pictures a situation in which the Brexit negotiations were 
successfully concluded and the impacts on trade relations are partly mitigated. Such a 
mutual agreement also implies not only preferential trade conditions but also continuing 
good political relationship that extends to other areas than simply to economic issues. It 
can be expected that from the three listed scenarios, the UK-EU relationship is the closest 
and deepest under this scenario. 
Independently of the specificity of the preferential trade agreement, the overall 
economic impact for both the EU and the UK is to be less severe than either of the 
previously described scenarios. Depending on the actual form of the agreement and its 
reach and coverage of concrete sectors, we could make some conclusions on implications 
for specific businesses.  
As of March 2017, most UK and EU businesses might be expecting that the post-
Brexit relations get limited to the WTO membership and the rules connected to this status. 
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If this scenario is the one to happen, it can be considered by firms as a good case scenario 
which can lead to an increased optimism. A stronger connection with the rest of the EU 
than expected and clearer prospects of the future might result in higher willingness to 
invest, especially given that since the June 2016 referendum there has been evidence of 
investment holding decisions.   
There might be a decline in interest in the EU markets comparing to the pre-Brexit 
referendum period, yet in comparison to the alternative scenario B, the decline should be 
more limited, thus the EU market in general is likely to stay attractive and one of the most 
popular destinations for UK exporters. For Market Access, this scenario seems to be the 
least harmful as the EU markets are its major strength and it can offer excellent services 
for a competitive price.  
Depending on the conditions of the bilateral agreement negotiated between the 
UK and the EU, the UK may have a space for negotiating trade agreements with third 
parties that can offer preferential conditions over the current ones that are unique for all 
EU member states. This can be seen as an opportunity for some British organisations that 
might decide to pursue their internationalization strategy in a target market that newly 
offers fewer trade barriers.   
 
3.4. Strategy recommendations to Market Access under each scenario 
 
This section of the report offers guidelines for the strategy of Market Access 
related to its partner Cormack Consultancy Group. There is first a common short-term 
recommendation, for the time before the conclusion of Brexit negotiations, followed by 
medium to long-term specific recommendations for each of the above described and 
analysed scenarios A, B and C.  
No matter what scenario is to materialize, a common short-term strategy is in 
order. As of March 2017—nice months following the Brexit vote, the depreciation of the 
British pound and the investment holding from the part of British firms can be considered 
to be the biggest obstacle, slowing down the sales process of MA-CCG services. First of 
all, the cost of services of Market Access has become much higher for British firms and 
organisations due to loss of competitiveness related to the GBP/EUR exchange rate. 
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Secondly, the overall optimism and willingness to invest in international expansion, and 
in particular in the EU markets, decreased dramatically for the UK firms.  
At this moment, it might be worthwhile to focus on businesses and organisations 
that are seeking internationalization to Europe such as British universities that want to 
find partners in EU member states and firms aiming at relocating their headquarters in 
order to keep their access to the Single Market. These potential clients do not have a lot 
of space to postpone their decision as the 2-year long Brexit negotiation period 
commences in March 2017.  
In addition to focusing on this type of clients that seek support in their 
internationalization now more than even, it might be useful to review the pricing 
structure. Given the decreased purchase power and willingness to invest (with the 
exception of the two concrete cases previously described), certain price adjustments or 
decrease in margins for the two partners might be necessary in order to achieve the desired 
turnover. 
 
 
Scenario A: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland leaves the UK – be flexible and 
ready to adapt 
 
The scenario of Hard Brexit and independent Scotland brings several additional 
years of uncertainty and instability for Scottish businesses. Similarly to observed 
behaviour of British firms months after the Brexit referendum, we are likely to see various 
strategies being put in place by local firms and organisations. Charles Cormack believes 
that the second Scottish independence vote, if successful, will bring more severe impacts 
on the economy that what could have been observed as a result of the Brexit referendum.  
Under these circumstances, it is important to stay up-to-date with the development 
and investigate and closely observe different behaviour and planned strategies of Scottish 
businesses. It might be useful to find a pattern or a trend, similarly to the case of British 
universities after the Brexit vote, and establish an adaptive strategy of acting upon the 
patterns and offering these clients the services of MA-CCG.  
As both Cormack Consultancy Group and Market Access are fairly small 
companies, they have the advantage of being able to shift focus from one group of target 
clients to another, and make quick changes and adaptations of the services offered. This 
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trait should be taken advantage of, especially when the behaviour or the extent of Scottish 
firms’ dedication to invest in their expansion or relocation is difficult to predict. 
Flexibility and adaptability are key in this scenario.  
An option to ensure more certain turnover and sales might be for CCG to allocate 
more resources to approach the Irish market and benefit from the stable economic 
environment, the high purchase power and access of the local businesses to the European 
Single Market and also to European funds. Moreover, Market Access would benefit not 
only from the above described characteristics, but also from sharing the same currency 
and not being subject to currency depreciations as in case of the UK, and at this moment 
Scotland. 
 
Scenario B: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland remains in the UK – refocus on 
other markets 
 
In case of “Hard” Brexit scenario in which the political pressure to separate 
Scotland (and to some extent also Northern Ireland) from the rest of the UK is absorbed 
and calmed down, the rules of WTO member apply to the UK as a whole, including 
Scotland. The trade relationship with the EU is straightforward but more distant in 
comparison to pre-Brexit period. 
The original premise of the partnership between Cormack Consultancy Group and 
Market Access was that the clients found by CCG would be using actively both the EU 
markets that Market Access covers and also the outside of EU. With decreased interest in 
the EU markets, the outside EU markets can become more attractive, leading to shifts of 
target towards markets such as the United States of America or Canada. Market Access 
has consultants in these markets, yet it is much less price competitive than in the EU 
markets. Moreover, in the USA, Cormack Consultancy Group has their own office and a 
Market Access USA consultant is rarely called for from the side of CCG.  
It is important to observe negotiations of the UK with third parties to see if they 
manage to negotiate a preferential agreement with a popular destination for British firms. 
Once that such an agreement is reached, it offers space for promoting it, in case a 
competent and price competitive consultant is available for collaboration in the market. 
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This suggestion is applicable only in medium to long term—when such new opportunity 
arises.  
The question of high potential of the Irish market is applicable also in this 
scenario, and so is the overall suggestions for flexibility and adaptability as the best 
strategy for this situation that encompasses complex changes. It is undeniable that the EU 
markets are the biggest strength of Market Access and this scenario would reduce the 
desirability of these markets. Nonetheless, it is too early to predict how severe will be the 
impact of Brexit on UK firms and organisations and their interest in EU markets. It is 
possible that the decline will not be too dramatic and fewer UK clients would not affect 
too much the partnership between CCG and Market Access.  
In case the impacts on the UK are too severe and Market Access does not have 
much to offer to the UK potential clients in terms of competitive price or desired target 
market, it would be advisable for Market Access to refocus their strengths and resources 
to respond to the needs of other more potential markets. Firstly, the opportunities brought 
up by the Baltics partner Civitta are numerous, and secondly, Market Access is pursuing 
their own internationalization strategy by starting their own office in a new market.  
 
Scenario C: Bilateral preferential agreement – wait and see, reinforce 
partnership 
 
Under scenario C it is to be expected lower interest from UK firms in the EU 
market in comparison to pre-Brexit period, yet higher than in any of the previous 
scenarios that rely on WTO membership status. Also, certain sectors might have 
privileged access to the EU market which can be an opportunity for MA-CCG to approach 
these sectors and offer their joint services both to the EU target markets that are price 
competitive, and also to other world markets.  
The overall recommendation for this scenario is to monitor and observe the 
evolution of the Brexit negotiations. In medium and long term, keep up-to-date with the 
negotiations of preferential trade agreements between the UK and third countries that 
could facilitate access to the given markets. In the analysis from Market Access 
perspective, it appears that interdependency of businesses is a key determinant. It is 
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crucial to observe the behaviour and strategies of potential clients and although Market 
Access offers a range of predefined services (See Chapter 1 of this report) based on 
distinct methodologies, each project is adapted to the requirements of the client and to a 
large extent is flexible. Moreover, finding clients in the UK market for Market Access is 
a full responsibility of Cormack Consultancy Group, their knowledge of the market and 
their own strategy. As it is Cormack Consultancy Group that has to stay more reactive 
and adapt their offer according to demand, good communication and willingness to 
cooperate and make changes from the side of Market Access is essential. To some extent, 
the “wait-and-see” strategy seems to be the best choice for Market Access, even though 
some suggestions regarding the strategy of CCG can come from Market Access.  
 
Concluding remarks to strategy recommendations 
Table 3 offers an overview of the description, analysis, and strategy 
recommendation for all three scenarios discussed. It is important to note that only the 
main topics and most prominent characteristics of each scenario are presented in the table. 
In reality, there is a short term strategy recommendation for the time until the Brexit 
negotiations are concluded that is common for all three scenarios that can possibly follow. 
For short term, it is suggested that Market Access focuses on potential clients from the 
UK that are from education sector, and on firms that need support with establishing their 
office in the EU market. A re-evaluation of fees from both sides might be necessary to 
remain competitive. Even for the medium term and long term, a general strategy guideline 
suggested for Market Access is to observe the negotiations, the behaviour of firms in the 
market, and be ready to adapt its services according to the current demand.  
The partnership between Market Access and Cormack Consultancy is rather 
recent, dating only to the year 2015. The joint services that CCG offers in the UK market 
are in the process of being developed and adapted, and they are still far from being fully 
established. Both firms are young, growing and flexible which is an important advantage 
given the type of clients they get and their requirements.  
It is the Scottish partner CCG that is present in the market and who is the one to 
make bigger adjustments and evaluate the needs of the local organisations and businesses. 
It can be considered as a good sign that CCG adapted their services right after the Brexit 
vote and managed to spot a pattern of behaviour, and even more, that Charles Cormack 
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was willing to share their internal strategy and plans, and contribute to the development 
of this report.  
The structured guidelines are rather general but given the nature of the 
partnership, and the interdependency of firms in the UK market and MA-CCG’s offer of 
services, they remain useful and valid for internal use.  
50 
 
Source: Author’s own conception 
 
 Description—main characteristics Impacts on the Market Access-
CCG partnership 
Main strategy recommendations 
Scenario A UK-EU trade relations: WTO member; 
Long lasting impacts on Scottish 
economy and hurt businesses;  
Distance between rest of the UK and 
Scotland 
Several years of instability with 
harmful impact on businesses; 
various strategies of Scottish 
firms to be expected 
Try to find pattern of behaviour of 
Scottish firms and organisations; be 
ready to respond with adapted services 
according to these patterns 
Scenario B UK-EU trade relations: WTO member; 
kept integrity of the UK—lower 
instability for Scotland 
 
Decline of interest in EU markets; 
higher trade costs; partial loss of 
strong advantage of Market Access 
in EU markets 
If severe loss of interest in EU markets 
from the UK and high price sensitivity, 
refocus resources on other markets 
Scenario C UK-EU trade relations: preferential trade 
agreement—better conditions in some 
areas than WTO member (similar to 
Canada or Ukraine model) 
Slight decline of interest in EU 
markets; possibility of some 
sectors having preferential access 
to EU markets; potential optimism 
in investment (good scenario) 
Observe status of negotiations, prepare 
for most UK firms using Market Access 
services to target the EU markets. 
Table 3 - Overview of analysis of scenarios 
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Conclusions 
 
This report is a product of the 6-month curricular internship at Market Access, a 
Portuguese-based international business consultancy. The study focuses on the strategic 
partnership with Scottish Cormack Consultancy Group that Market Access started 
recently, in 2015. The unexpected result of the Brexit referendum in which 52% voted to 
leave the EU brought a lot of uncertainty to many UK and EU businesses, including 
Market Access. In this report, we briefly recall the process of European integration, and 
clarify the discussion around Brexit and its expected impacts on the UK economy, EU, 
businesses, and potentially on Scotland.  
To make the strategy recommendations for Market Access, a selection of possible 
scenarios related to post-Brexit UK-EU trade relation is presented based on the literature 
and on official statements of Theresa May, Nicola Sturgeon, and the European Council 
draft guidelines as a reply to the letter triggering the Article 50. It is clear that the UK will 
seek to keep a “deep and special partnership after the UK leaves the EU, including 
economic and security cooperation” (GOV.UK, 2017), yet both the UK and the EU 
acknowledge that “cherry picking”—intension to get benefits of EU membership without 
compromising on EU rules—is out of question. Three scenarios are listed and described; 
Scenario A: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland leaves the UK, Scenario B: “Hard” Brexit, Scotland 
remains in the UK, and Scenario C: Bilateral preferential agreement.  
In case of Scenario A with Scotland leaving the UK and becoming an independent 
country, it is expected that economic and political instability will last for many years 
which will have a severely negative impact on local firms. As of MA-CCG partnership, 
it is important to observe a trend in behaviour of Scottish firms that might arise and try to 
adapt their services to meet the demand in the market. In Scenario B, Scotland remains 
in the UK and there is a hard Brexit. MA-CCG should expect to have a decline of interest 
in the EU markets due to higher trading costs. There might be an increased interest in 
outside of EU markets that could be taken advantage of, yet low price competitiveness of 
Market Access in outside of EU markets might be a limitation. In Scenario C, a bilateral 
preferential agreement between the UK and the EU is negotiated which given the 
circumstances and wishes of the British population can be considered as the “deep and 
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special partnership” that Theresa May aims for. The impacts on businesses will be much 
less severe than in previous scenarios and possibly recent investment holding decisions 
observed in the UK market can be reverted.  
A general short term strategy should be to respond to the demand that appeared 
in the UK which came from the UK universities and research centres that following the 
Brexit vote decided to find partners in the EU member states. Another profile of clients 
are firms that need support in relocating their head office to an EU member state. An 
adjustment of price structure might be necessary given the depreciation of British pound 
related to Euro.  
For medium and long term strategy, given the nature of the two firms and their 
partnership, flexibility and adaptability is of highest importance, in addition to good 
communication between the parties. Charles Cormack, the founder of CCG, disclosed 
their plans for case of the UK losing access to the Single Market which is a great 
contribution not only for this report but for reducing uncertainty for Market Access. CCG 
proved that they are adaptable in a situation when they managed to turn the threat of 
Brexit—a threat for the future trade between the UK and the EU—into an opportunity by 
offering new service of support at relocation of offices in an EU member state.  
The best overall strategy for Market Access is to “wait-and-see”, observe the 
negotiations and get ready for a slight decrease of interest in the EU markets. A lot of 
adaptability and flexibility will be needed from the side of the Scottish partner to try to 
find clients that MA-CCG can help. In the meantime, it might be worthwhile to focus 
more strengths on other markets, in particular the Baltic markets, and to have a more pro-
active expansionist strategy for new markets. 
Limitations 
The choice of scenarios is based on the literature, but the selection is strongly 
affected by official statements of Theresa May and the European Council draft 
guidelines as a reply to the letter triggering Article 50. It is possible that a different and 
at the moment unpredictable or unlikely scenario might take place that is distinct from 
the ones presented in this report. As there is no concrete historical example of an EU 
member state leaving the EU, there is no model to follow. In reality, Brexit might take 
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the shape of a scenario mentioned in the literature such as the Switzerland model or 
even a more innovative scenario such as the Continental partnership.  
It seems that Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister, is determined to take the UK 
through the process of Brexit, yet the opposition such as Labour Party, the Scottish 
National Party, and several members of the UK parliament threaten to stop Brexit. In 
April, 2017, Theresa May announced snap election for June 2017, with the motivation 
of calming down the unrests in the parliament and reducing the power of the opposition 
to Brexit (BBC News, 2017c). Although the polls suggest a strong lead of the 
Conservative party of Theresa May, the actual results might be of a surprise and might 
change the balance in the UK Parliament and redirect Brexit.  
A more concrete methodology could be followed when tackling this problem such 
as option valuation model or game theory to make a more scientific evaluation of what 
Courtney et al. (1997) call Level 2 situations. These approaches would require strictly 
defined scenarios with concrete outcomes and assigned probabilities that given the nature 
of the Brexit situation and the degree of involvement of Market Access in the UK market 
would add only little value to the analysis. Moreover, such a structured model that would 
make assumptions on large number of variables and outcomes might be more misleading 
than the qualitative analysis that this report offers.   
There is a possibility that Brexit might take a different direction than one of the 
three scenarios analysed in this report. Still in that case, the analysis developed in this 
study might be of help and the report can work as a basis or inspiration for future research. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Interview, by the author, with Mr. Charles Cormack, the 
founder and board member of Cormack Consultancy Group 
Interview from 24.03.2017 
 
Questions: 
1) Have the target markets of British potential clients (leads) changed since the 
Brexit vote?    
 
Answer: Yes, very clearly, at the moment UK companies are less interested in 
the EU and more interested in other markets. This is simply down to a lack of clarity on 
what trading relationships will look like in Europe rather than a turning away from the 
EU.  Also confidence is much lower, especially amongst SME’s. Universities are an 
exception to this trend; they are focusing on Europe. Until June 23rd, 2016, UK 
universities considered the EU home market, now they need to develop and integrate 
strategies for Europe. 
 
2) The refocus on different markets and slight turn away (at least in short term) 
from the EU is consistent with literature predictions. What are the new target 
markets that you observe to be more popular? 
 
Answer: Definitely we have observed an increased interest in the USA. Also, 
there is a higher demand for South America, mainly Brazil. We have noticed some 
changes in the Asian market as well, but not necessarily related to the Brexit vote. 
 
3) Does the transition of CCG Baltics to CIVITTA have something to do with 
Brexit?   
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Answer: Yes, it does. We have created that partnership as part of our strategy of 
shifting focus from the Baltic markets to a more global outlook, and also to give us access 
to a wider range of services for our clients. 
  
 
4) Is CCG thinking about independence of Scotland from the UK? And if yes, 
what would be their strategy in case Scotland is no longer part of the UK?  
 
 Answer: It is too soon to say, we are of course thinking about another 
independence vote, and I think it is much more likely to be successful this time as 
Scotland is much more pro EU than England. However, another referendum will add to 
the uncertainty and will have a negative effect on business. CCG may look at relocating 
our head office to Ireland. 
 
5) About the Scotland independence vote, you said it’s more likely it would be 
pro-EU. What is the advantage of Ireland over Scotland that is not in the UK 
and is part of the EU?  
 
Answer: In case of “Hard” Brexit, and therefore loss of access to the Single 
Market, CCG UK will look into moving their head office to Ireland, keeping the current 
office in Scotland. Even under the scenario of Scotland leaving the UK and staying in the 
EU, the uncertainty and politic instability is likely to bring more severe negative effects 
(at least in short term) than seen right after the Brexit vote. 
 
6) Everybody talks about uncertainty as a source of damage on real economy. 
Do you have some insights from Scotland or the UK as a whole? 
 
Answer: We have seen a strong slowdown of investment when the first Scottish 
referendum was about to take place. It was the uncertainty about the vote and possibility 
of Scottish independence from the UK that led to such a decline in investment. Nine 
months after the Brexit referendum, the capital market in Scotland is suffering and a lot 
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of firms make investment holding decision. With on-going Brexit negotiations, the 
second Scottish referendum might result into more damage for businesses in Scotland.  
 
7) The idea of moving the head office to Ireland would be applicable in case that 
the UK loses access to the EU Single Market, isn’t it? Would it be only to 
remain listed as an EU company or also to start exploring the Irish market and 
finding Irish clients interested in export services? 
 
Answer: Yes, but also because we would want to be involved in some work as an 
EU based company.  We already have some clients in Ireland, so we may expand that but 
it would not be the main reason.  
 
